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Uniform Commercial Code: Buyers of Nonconforming
Goods Who Revoke Acceptance Under Section 2-608
May Recover the Purchase Price from a Remote
Supplier Despite Lack of Privity of Contract
Shortly after John Durfee purchased a new Saab automobile in
June, 1974, it developed several annoying defects.1 Despite repeated
attempts, two Saab dealers failed to make adequate repairs under the
terms of the standard new-car warranty. After some 6,300 miles of
use, Durfee notified the wholesale distributor that he would not sub-
mit the automobile for further repairs and brought an action against
both the selling dealer and the wholesale distributor' seeking recovery
of the full purchase price. The trial court, sitting without a jury,
awarded plaintiff $600 in damages for breach of warranty, but, since
the court found that the defects did not justify rescission of the sales
contract, it did not order return of the purchase price.3 On appeal,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to enter judgment against both the dealer and distributor,
holding: that the defects in the automobile substantially impaired its
value to the plaintiff, thereby entitling him to revoke his acceptance
1. Plaintiff encountered numerous problems with the automobile. At the time
plaintiff filed suit he complained of six defects that remained uncorrected: (1) the
passenger seat had not been reinstalled after having been removed by the dealer for
repair; (2) the automobile continued to stall; (3) the seatbelt warning system continued
to activate without apparent cause; (4) a rattle persisted; (5) the temperature gauge
registered hot; and (6) shortly after starting the motor, the heating unit malfunctioned.
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1977). Although not
discussed in the court's opinion, plaintiff contended that the stalling problem was a
safety hazard since the automobile at least once stalled "smack in the middle of a set
of railroad tracks." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 10.
2. Plaintiff's Saab was manufactured by Saab-Scania AB of Sweden, a foreign
corporation. Saabs were distributed in the United States by Saab-Scania of America,
Inc. which supplied and installed accessory parts and delivered the vehicles to dealers.
The automobile's warranty was, by its terms, a warranty from the American distribu-
tor. See note 11 infra.
3. The trial court apparently decided the case on the basis of the common law
rather than the controlling sections of the Uniform Commercial Code. The trial court's
opinion did not mention the U.C.C., and used the term, "rescission," which has been
replaced in the Code by "revocation of acceptance." See notes 4, 71 infra. Reference
to the Code first appears in published material in plaintiff-appellant's brief to the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Plaintiff apparently did not draw the court's attention to
the relevant sections of the U.C.C. at the trial level. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); id. at app. (contain-
ing the text of the complaint, answer, and trial court opinion).
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of the vehicle' and to recover the full retail price' as well as incidental
damages;' that the repair-and-replacement clause of the distributor's
warranty failed as an exclusive remedy when the automobile was not
placed in reasonably good operating condition; and that lack of priv-
ity of contract did not bar plaintiffs recovery of the retail purchase
price from the wholesale distributor. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports,
Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977).
Although the first two issues reached by the Durfee court repre-
sent new developments in Minnesota, their disposition by the court
4. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 352-53, 354-55 (Minn.
1977). U.C.C. § 2-608 (1962), currently codified in Minnesota as MwN. STAT. § 336.2-
608 (1978), provides,
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose
nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be
cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was
reasonably induced either by the difficulty of discovery before accept-
ance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the
buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any
substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own
defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to
the goods involved as if he had rejected them.
The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted in Minnesota by Act of May 26, 1965,
ch. 811, 1965 Minn. Laws 1290, from the 1962 official draft. The official numbering
system was retained with the addition of the chapter prefix, 336. Except as otherwise
noted, the statutory provisions cited herein are substantively unchanged from the 1962
official draft. 21A MisN. STAT. ANN., Preface at III (West 1966). In this Comment,
textual references to provisions of the U.C.C. will be presented without repeated refer-
ence to the 1962 version and the Minnesota Statutes chapter prefix.
5. Durfee v. Rd Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353, 355, 357 (Minn.
1977). Section 2-711 provides that when the buyer justifiably revokes acceptance under
§ 2-608, he may recover the purchase price.
6. 262 N.W.2d at 357. U.C.C. §§ 2-711(1)(b), 2-713(1) read together, give the
revoking buyer a right to recover incidental and consequential damages in addition to
the price paid. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1), defines incidental damages to include "expenses
reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of
goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commis-
sions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to
the delay or other breach." U.C.C. Official Comment 1, states that this subsection "is
intended to provide reimbursement for the buyer who incurs reasonable expenses in
connection with the handling of. . . goods whose acceptance may be justifiably re-
voked. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-715, Official Comment 1. The Durfee court, relying on this
comment, permitted the plaintiff to recover incidental damages of $116.30 as reim-
bursement for repair costs. 262 N.W.2d at 357 (citing Lanners v. Whitney, 247 Or. 223,
428 P.2d 398 (1967)). Although plaintiff did not prove any consequential damages, the
Code does permit their recovery.
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was consistent with well established case law in other U.C.C. jurisdic-
tions. The court first considered U.C.C. section 2-608, which provides
that where defects in goods substantially impair their value, an ag-
grieved buyer may, by giving notice within a reasonable period of
time, revoke his acceptance and recover the purchase price.7 The
Durfee court found that the "succession of minor defects . . .
[coupled] with the frequent stalling of the Saab" constituted sub-
stantial impairment,8 and permitted revocation of acceptance even
7. U.C.C. § 2-608. For the full text of this section, see note 4 supra. The revoca-
tion of acceptance remedy is available to the buyer in the second of three phases of
the sales transaction. A buyer who acts promptly has the option of "rejecting" the
goods for any defect under § 2-602-entitling him to recover the price paid under § 2-
711-or accepting the goods and recovering loss of bargain damages under § 2-714. The
buyer who has let the reasonable period for rejection pass must show that the defects
in the goods substantially impair their value in order to be entitled to "revoke accept-
ance" under § 2-608 and to secure the advantages of the optional remedies available
to the rejecting buyer. Once the reasonable period for revocation of acceptance has
passed, the buyer must keep the goods and is limited to recovery of loss of bargain
damages under § 2-714. Compare U.C.C. § 2-602 with id. § 2-608 and id. § 2-714.
The reasonable period within which revocation of acceptance must take place is
not a fixed period, but may be extended by the latency of the defects or by the buyer's
reasonable reliance on the seller's assurances of a non-forthcoming cure. See generally
J. WHrrE & R. SummEns, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw UNDER THE UNhmRm COMMERCL CODE
§ 8-3 at, 260-64 (1972).
The Durfee court summarized the following requirements prescribed by § 2-608
for an effective revocation of acceptance:
(1) the goods must be nonconforming;
(2) the nonconformity must substantially impair the value of the goods to
the buyer;
(3) the buyer must have accepted the goods on the reasonable assumption
that the nonconformity would be cured;
(4) the nonconformity must not have been seasonably cured;
(5) the buyer must notify the seller of his revocation;
(6) revocation must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer dis-
covers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any sub-
stantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their
own defects; and
(7) the buyer must take reasonable care of the goods for which he has
revoked acceptance.
262 N.W.2d at 353 (footnotes omitted).
8. 262 N.W.2d at 354. Although the trial court had found that the Saab
"'apparently could not, or would not, be placed in reasonably good operating condi-
tion'" it refused to rescind the contract. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the factual finding but differed with the trial court's conclusions of law, noting that
the trial court had not addressed the question in the language of the U.C.C. Id.
The supreme court announced a common sense approach to substantial impair-
ment: allowing revocation of acceptance "if the defect substantially interferes with
operation of the vehicle or a purpose for which it was purchased." Id. at 354. In doing
so, the court approved commentators' analogies "to the determination of a material
breach under traditional contract law." Id. at 353 (citing J. WHrra & R. SuMxMR, supra
19791
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though the automobile had been driven some 6,300 miles over a nine
month period before notice was given.'
note 7, § 8-3, at 257-58). The court noted that the minor defects alone "might not
constitute substantial impairment," but quoted with approval from Stofman v.
Keenan Motors, Inc., 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 58, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1252, 1259 (1973),
which held that a stalling defect was ipso facto substantial impairment because of the
danger of highway accidents. 262 N.W.2d at 355. It appears, therefore, that safety
related defects such as stalling will weigh heavily in future determinations of substan-
tial impairment.
Courts in other Code jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions in interpreting
substantial impairment in the context of defective automobiles. Some have dealt with
more grievous defects than those encountered in Durfee and so are not directly compa-
rable. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969)
(engine misfired and consumed excessive amounts of oil and gasoline); Overland Bond
& Investment Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972) (transmission
fell out and brakes failed); Testo v. Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App.
39, 554 P.2d 349 (1976) (extensive damage to engine of used car caused by unsuitable
transmission). In cases in which defects were less severe, courts have reached conflict-
ing results. Compare Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954
(1978) (revocation of acceptance allowed for purely cosmetic but persistent paint de-
fects) with Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971)
(cosmetic defects alone are not substantial impairment). Easily reparable defects will
generally not be held to constitute substantial impairment. See Rozmuz v. Thomp-
son's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966) (no substantial
impairment where engine mounts were loose). But, regardless of the severity of a
defect, it may substantially impair the value of a vehicle if an inept or uncooperative
dealer simply does not make repairs. See Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972) ("Unsuccessful repair is itself a sufficient nonconform-
ity to give rise to the buyer's right of revocation of acceptance."). If the injury is
attributable to events occurring after the sale, the seller will not be liable under § 2-
608 because the vehicle would have conformed to the sales contract when accepted.
See Collum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 6 Ill. App. 3d 317, 285 N.E.2d 532 (1972) (absence of
oil filter resulted in fire, but since missing filter was shown to be result of serviceman's
oversight, buyer failed to prove damage caused by "defect"). Where a defect exists at
the time of sale, even if it was latent and does not appear until after the sale, and the
defect interferes with the actual operation of the vehicle, courts generally find substan-
tial impairment if the defect is not set right. See, e.g., Stofman v. Keenan Motors, Inc.,
63 Pa. D. & C.2d 56, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1252 (1973) (substantial impairment found
for stalling problem and other minor defects).
9. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) provides that revocation of acceptance must occur within a
reasonable period of time after discovery of the defects, and before the occurrence of
any substantial change in the goods that is not caused by their own defect See note 4
supra. Plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant Saab-Scania's attorney approximately nine
months after purchasing the automobile and three months after initiating a suit in
which he informed the distributor that plaintiff would no longer "submit the car for
any further repair." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant app. at A-11. Plaintiff put the auto-
mobile in storage and did not use it after writing the letter. 262 N.W.2d at 352. The
court apparently treated this letter as the act of revocation. See id. Since no specific
form of notice is prescribed by the Code, plaintiff's letter and subsequent behavior
consituted fair notice of revocation. See Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the
Consumer Buyer, 75 COM. L.J. 354, 356-57, 363 n.40 (1970).
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The court next considered U.C.C. section 2-719, which makes
Code remedies available to the buyer when a seller's otherwise per-
missible "repair-and-replacement" remedy agreement limiting or
excluding all other remedies is invalidated because circumstances
cause the remedy to fail of its essential purpose. 10 The defendant
The reasonable length of time in which a buyer must revoke may be extended if
the defect was latent at the time of acceptance. See generally J. Wtr & R. SuMMERs,
supra note 7, § 8-3, at 261-62. In Durfee, the court noted that the stalling problem, on
which the finding of substantial impairment was mainly based, did not appear until
five months after plaintiff had accepted the Saab. 262 N.W.2d at 354. The reasonable
period for revocation may also be extended if the buyer's delay was induced by the
seller's reasonable assurances of a cure that is not forthcoming. See generally J. WHrr
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 8-3, at 262-64.
The Durfee court did not deal directly with the issue of whether the nine months
intervening between purchase and notice of revocation constituted a reasonable length
of time. It did state, however, in apparent reference to the repeated repair attempts,
see 262 N.W.2d at 351-52, that "[mI]any courts find that the period in which the seller
attempts to cure the nonconformity is not part of the time in which the buyer must
act." 262 N.W.2d at 353 n.4, (citing Four Sons Bakery, Inc. v. Dulman, 542 F.2d 829
(10th Cir. 1976); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn.
App. 1972)). Other Code jurisdictions have permitted revocation on this principle after
much longer delays. See, e.g., Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d
954 (1978) (17 months). See generally J. WHmrr & R. SumMERs, supra note 7, f 8-3, at
264; 41 TmN. L. Rxv. 173 (1973); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 354 (1975).
Although troubled by the question, the Durfee court held that "in this circum-
stance" the 6,300 miles of operation between purchase and revocation did not
"constitute a substantial change in condition so as to preclude revocation of accept-
ance." 262 N.W.2d at 353 n.4 (citing Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972), in which revocation was permitted after approxi-
mately 4,200 miles of use). Other Code jurisdictions have gone much further than
Durfee. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969)
(revocation of acceptance permitted after 20,000 miles of use over an 11-month period).
When substantial use has been made of a defective automobile by the buyer, many
courts have allowed the seller a set-off for the value of such use, relying on the Code's
general retention of the equitable principles of prior law in § 1-103. See, e.g., Moore v.
Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tenn. App. 1972): Although
there is no specific Code provision authorizing such a set-off, commentators have
generally agreed that such a right exists. See, e.g., Phillips, supra, at 357 ("In all cases
of revocation after any significant use by the buyer, the seller should be able to recover
from the buyer in restitution for the fair value of any benefit conferred as a result of
such use."). The Durfee court did not reach the question of whether defendant was
entitled to a set-off for the value of the 6300 miles plaintiff had driven the Saab because
defendant failed to raise it. 262 N.W.2d at 353 n.4. Since the defendant had prevailed
in the lower court on the issue of "rescission," there was no apparent need to raise the
question of set-off on appeal. The court's reliance on this omission by defendants seems
questionable.
10. U.C.C. § 2-719 provides,
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section and
of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this article and may limit or alter
1979]
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distributor, Saab-Scandia, contended that plaintiff had no recourse
to Code remedies so long as defendants stood ready to attempt fur-
ther repairs on the automobile under its warranty." The court re-
the measure of damages recoverable under this article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of nonconforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its
essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this chapter.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limita-
tion or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for
injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscion-
able but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
11. Saab-Scania relied chiefly on this issue in its appeal before the Minnesota
Supreme Court. See Brief for Defendant-Respondent (Saab) at 9-12.
The Saab owner's manual contained the following warranty and disclaimers:
IMPORTANT NOTICE TO OWNER, PLEASE
READ DISCLAIMER OF IMPLIED
WARRANTIES
THIS WARRANTY IS THE ONLY WARRANTY APPLICABLE TO YOUR
1974 SAAB AUTOMOBILE (except for the Emission System Warranty)
AND IS EXPRESSLY IN LIEU OF ANY WARRANTIES OTHERWISE
IMPLIED BY LAW, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IM-
PLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND THE IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. SAAB-
SCANIA, AB., Saab-Scania of America, Inc. AND FRANCHISED SAAB
DEALERS, DO NOT, INDIVIDUALLY OR COLLECTIVELY, ASSUME
OR AUTHORIZE ANYONE TO ASSUME FOR ANY OR ALL OF THEM
ANY OBLIGATION OR RESPONSIBILITY TO EITHER THE PUR-
CHASER OF A SAAB AUTOMOBILE OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON
WITH RESPECT TO THE CONDITION OF SUCH AUTOMOBILE
OTHER THAN AS EXPRESSLY ASSUMED IN THIS WARRANTY.
BASIC WARRANTY
Your 1974 Saab Automobile, manufactured by SAAB-SCANIA AB. of
Sweden, and accessories supplied by Saab-Scania of America, Inc., and
installed upon it in the process of delivery, are waranted by Saab-Scania of
America, Inc. to be free from defects in material and workmanship (except
tires which are separately warranted by their manufacturers) for a period of
twelve (12) months, unlimited mileage, from the earlier of either (1) the date
of the original retail delivery or (2) the date of the original use by Saab-
Scania of America, Inc.
Your franchised Saab dealer will repair or replace defective parts at no
charge for parts and labor, provided, however, that it is notified of the defect
within the above stated warranty period. THIS REMEDY IS THE SOLE
AND EXCLUSIVE REMEDY AVAILABLE UNDER THIS WARRANTY
AND ALL OTHER REMEDIES ARE HEREBY SPECIFICALLY EX-
CLUDED. FURTHERMORE, NEITHER SAAB-SCANIA AB., Saab-
Scania of America, Inc., NOR ANY FRANCHISED SAAB DEALER
SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCI-
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jected Saab-Scania's contention and, relying on the trial court's find-
ing that the Saab "could not, or would not, be placed in reasonably
good operating condition" despite numerous repair attempts, held
that the seller's exclusive remedy agreement had failed of its essential
purpose. 2 Plaintiff was therefore permitted to seek relief through the
revocation of acceptance remedy provided by the U.C.C. Durfee's
DENTAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM A DEFECT WITHIN THE
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THIS WARRANTY.
Brief for Defendant-Respondent (Saab) at 4-5 (emphasis in original). For a general
discussion of both legal and practical issues related to the standard new automobile
warranty, see Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the
Automobile Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. Rsv. 1006, and a companion article, Whitford,
Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado About Nothing,
1968 Wis. L. lav. 83.
12. 262 N.W.2d at 356-57.
13. Id. at 357. Since the U.C.C. provides for recovery of consequential and inci-
dental damages upon buyer's rightful revocation of acceptance, see note 6 supra, Saab-
Scania's separate disclaimer of reponsibility for these classes of damages, which was
linked with the ineffective exclusive repair-and-replacement remedy provision, see
note 11 supra, was held similarly ineffective as the disclaimer. 262 N.W.2d at 357.
Plaintiff was therefore permitted to recover incidental damages. See note 6 supra.
Saab-Scania also separately disclaimed responsibility for consequential damages.
See note 11 supra. Because plaintiff did not prove any consequential damages, the
Durfee court did not reach the question of whether this separate disclaimer would be
effective. Disclaimers of consequential damages present a more interesting question
than the incidental damages dealt with in Durfee. Section 2-719(3) deals specifically
with disclaimers of consequential damages, rendering them ineffective only if
"unconscionable." See note 10 supra. The use of the term "unconscionable" in this
subsection seems to apply a more rigorous standard to plaintiffs seeking to recover
consequential damages in the face of an express disclaimer than other classes of dam-
ages. There is a split in authority over whether this subsection should be given separate
effect in cases like Durfee where a plaintiff would otherwise be privileged to recover
consequential damages because of the failure in essential purpose of an exclusive
contractual remedy under U.C.C. § 2-719(2). Compare Jones & McKnight Corp. v.
Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39, 43-45 (N.D. IMI. 1970) (interpreting Pennsylvania's
enactment of the U.C.C. to permit plaintiff to recover consequential damages when
an exclusive remedy has failed of its essential purpose under § 2-719(2) absent a
showing of unconscionability required by § 2-719(3)) with County Asphalt, Inc. v.
Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 444
F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (interpreting Ohio's enactment of
the U.C.C. to require application of the more rigorous unconscionability standard of
§2-719(3) under similar circumstances). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
in interpreting Minnesota's enactment of the U.C.C., has predicted that Minnesota
would follow the former authority, holding that "the fundamental intent of section 2-
719(2) reflects that a remedial limitation's failure of essential purpose makes available
all contractual remedies, including consequential damages authorized pursuant to
sections 2-714 and 2-715." Soo Line R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th
Cir. 1977). The Durfee court's reasoning in holding plaintiff entitled to incidental
damages under section 2-719(2) despite the warranty's separate disclaimer and the fact
that the court cited Soo Line to support its conclusion, suggests that the rule set out
1979]
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holding that an exclusive repair-and-replacement remedy may be
invalidated by the failure to successfully cure nonconformities within
a reasonable period of time is supported by the case law of other
U.C.C. jurisdictions. 4
The more important aspect of the case is its addition of the
Code's revocation of acceptance remedy to the list of legal weapons
the consumer-buyer may wield against the non-privy, remote sup-
plier of defective goods. 5 Under the U.C.C., an aggrieved buyer who
has accepted goods with defects that substantially impair their value
has the option of retaining the goods and bringing an action for loss
of bargain damages under section 2-714,11 or revoking acceptance
under section 2-6081" and recovering the purchase price upon return
in Soo Line will be followed when the issue reaches the Minnesota Supreme Court. See
262 N.W.2d at 357; see generally, J. WH=rr & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 12-10, at
382.
14. The Durfee court cited Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D.
Del. 1973) as support for this point. See 262 N.W.2d at 356. Beal provides this widely
cited formulation of the application of section 2-719(2) to repair-and-replacement
clauses in motor vehicle warranties:
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of defective
parts, whose presence constitute a breach of an express warranty, is to give
the seller an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting the
risks to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential damages
that might otherwise arise. From the point of view of the buyer the purpose
of the exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract
within a reasonable time after a defective part is discovered. When the
warrantor fails to correct the defect as promised within a reasonable time he
is liable for a breach of that warranty .... The limited, exclusive remedy
fails of its purpose and is thus avoided under § 2-719(2), whenever the war-
rantor fails to correct the defect within a reasonable period.
354 F. Supp. at 426 (citation omitted).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously interpreted Minnesota's en-
actment of § 2-719(2) to justify a finding of "failure of essential purpose" when the
warrantor refused to repair under the terms of its warranty. Soo Line R. Co. v. Frue-
hauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1371 (8th Cir. 1977), cited at 262 N.W.2d at 356 n.11. It is
clear, however, that a refusal to repair is not a prerequisite to the buyer's recovery.
See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 427 n.2 (D. Del. 1973) ("good
faith attempts to repair might be relevant to the issue of what constitutes a reasonable
time. However, since § 2-719(2) operates whenever a party is deprived of his contrac-
tual remedy there is no need for a plaintiff to prove that failure to repair was willful
or negligent."). Beal was also cited by the Durfee court. See 262 N.W.2d at 356 n.11.
For a detailed analysis of the interpretive problems of section 2-719(2), see Eddy, On
the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of UCC Section 2-
719(2), 65 CAuy. L. REv. 28 (1977).
15. "Remote supplier" will be used in this Comment to describe all parties in
the chain of distribution-wholesalers and manufacturers-who are not in direct con-
tractual privity with the buyer.
16. See note 33 infra.
17. See note 4 supra.
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of the goods to the seller.18 Although consumer-buyers prior to Durfee
were generally able to recover loss of bargain damages from a remote
defendant when there was a breach of an express warranty regardless
of formal privity, ' Durfee is apparently the first case in any jurisdic-
tion in which the U.C.C. remedy of revocation of acceptance has
explicitly been invoked against a remote supplier of defective goods
in the absence of privity of contract. 0
The privity requirement historically has been a major obstacle
to consumers' recovery from remote suppliers of defective goods. At
common law, privity of contract was a prerequisite to a buyer's recov-
ery for breach of warranty. This derives from the fundamental prem-
ise of the law of contracts: the consensual nature of contractual obli-
gations. Without a contract between the parties, the remote supplier
could not be said to have consented to undertake any obligations to
the ultimate consumer; the aggrieved consumer could not, therefore,
maintain an action in contract.2 1 The requirement of contractual
privity was carried over into codifications of the law of contracts.
Both the Uniform Sales Act2 and the Uniform Commercial Code
limited the buyer's remedies for breach of warranty to actions against
the "seller." Because neither uniform law mentioned any other po-
tential defendant, courts assumed that privity of contract between
the buyer and the seller was a requirement" in cases involving only
18. Recovery is possible under U.C.C. § 2-711. See note 5 supra.
19. See notes 26-36 infra and accompanying text.
20. Research has disclosed no case comparable to the Durfee court's explicit
application of § 2-608 against a non-privy defendant although at least two courts have
reached a comparable result to that in Durfee through indirect means. See note 37 infra
and accompanying text.
21. See generally W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 613-22 (4th ed.
1971).
22. The Uniform Sales Act was a widely adopted predecessor to the U.C.C. The
Act was in effect in Minnesota from June 1, 1917, see Act of April 20, 1917, ch. 465, §
78, 1917 Minn. Laws 792, to July 1, 1966, see Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, § 336.10-
103, -105, 1965 Minn. Laws 1484-85 and in many other states for a roughly coterminous
period. See 30 MiNN. STAT. ANN. 55 (1947) (table showing states in which adopted). In
Minnesota, the Uniform Sales Act was codified in MuN. STAT. § 512.01-.79 (1961).
23. By its terms, the Uniform Sales Act's provisions for remedies for breach of
warranty gave a cause of action to the buyer only for breaches of warranty by the seller.
The relevant provisions were prefaced by the phrase, "[w]here there is a breach of
warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election. . . ." MINN. STAT. § 512.69(1)
(1961) (emphasis added). The parallel provision of the U.C.C. provides: "[The buyer]
may recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in the
ordinary course of events from the seller's breach .. ." U.C.C. § 2-714(1).
24. See generally Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66
COLUM. L. Rxv. 917 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Economic Loss]. See also Note,
Products Liability in Commercial Transactions 60 MnNN. L. REv. 1061, 1066-69 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Products Liability].
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economic loss.2
Although not specifically authorized by these two uniform laws,
an exception to the privity requirement has developed for cases in
which the remote supplier has expressly warranted the goods to the
ultimate buyer."8 An express warranty may take a variety of forms.
25. The U.C.C. provides an explicit exception to the privity requirement for
cases involving non-economic loss. See note 93 infra. The term economic loss will be
used in this Comment to embrace both loss of bargain and expectation loss. Loss of
bargain refers to loss represented by the product's failure to be worth the price paid,
for example, an automobile that does not run properly. Expectation loss refers to
incidental and consequential pecuniary loss suffered as a result of the product's dimin-
ished utility, for instance, the buyer pays a license tax on a nonoperable vehicle or loses
wages because the defective automobile fails to transport him to his job. Economic loss
does not include the more catastrophic injuries commonly associated with products
liability actions. Included in this category are personal injury, accidental loss of the
product itself due to a defect in part of product, and physical property damage. The
latter three classes of loss are recoverable in tort, in the absence of privity.
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 402A (1965). The U.C.C. approves the tort treat-
ment of non-economic injury set forth in the Restatement. See U.C.C. § 2-318; note
93 infra.
26. The express warranty exception to the privity rule was developed in cases
involving personal injuries. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d
409, (1932), second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934). In Baxter, the court
found a manufacturer's advertising claim that an automobile windshield was shatter-
proof created an express warranty to the ultimate consumer who was injured through
reliance on the claim. Id. at 463, 12 P.2d at 412. Courts reasoned that the remote
supplier's advertising, voluntarily directed towards the ultimate consumer, provides a
basis for recovery that approximates the traditional notion of contractual privity and
can be viewed as a consensual duty. See generally Economic Loss, supra note 24, at
920-22. Some authorities contend that the relationship between the remote supplier
who falsely represents the quality of his goods and the ultimate consumer who is
injured through reliance on it satisfies the privity requirement in the traditional sense
of that word. Since it was the remote supplier who induced the purchase of the defec-
tive product through his advertising, these authorities would view the middlemen as
mere conduits in the transaction. See generally Economic Loss, supra note 24, Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099,
1134-38 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel]; id. at
933. Because express warranties approximate contractual privity, courts were also
willing to extend the express warranty exception to the privity rule to cases involving
only economic loss. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11
N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962) (express warranty sufficient to
support clothing manufacturer's recovery from remote chemical supplier for cost of
defective chemicals and profits lost due to the defect); Inglis v. American Motors
Corp., 3 Ohio St. 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965) (loss of bargain recovered by consumer
buyer from remote manufacturer of defective automobile based on express warranty
found in advertising). The express warranty exception to the privity requirement is
now generally accepted in American jurisdictions. See J. WsnrE & R. SuMMERS, supra
note 7, § 11-6, at 335; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 836 & n.239 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel] (collecting cases which have so held). Express warranty
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As in Durfee, it may consist of a conventional written statement,
provided by the remote supplier to accompany the goods to the ulti-
mate buyer, warranting that the goods are of a stated quality or fit
for a particular purpose.Y The remote supplier may also create an
express warranty through the less obvious means of mass media ad-
vertising.2s Representations of quality in advertising are usually in-
tended to reach and influence the ultimate purchaser rather than the
intermediate dealer, and many courts assess liability if the goods fail
to live up to these claims.' A buyer may, therefore, often be able to
bring an action directly against an express warrantor despite the
absence of formal privity 5
Although some courts have perceived such an action as outside
of the Sales Act and U.C.C. and have therefore ignored their provi-
sions regarding remedies for breach of warranty, 31 many courts have
directly applied the U.C.C.'s remedy provisions in such cases 3 -
typically section 2-714.11 Minnesota Statutes section 325.953(2)
continues to be the only contract theory upon which relief can be granted in the
absence of privity for economic loss in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (strict tort liability and
implied warranty theories restricted to cases in which there was personal injury or
property damage, but recovery for loss of bargain and lost profits on express warranty
grounds permitted).
27. U.C.C. § 2-313 (providing for the creation of express warranties by affirma-
tion, promise, description, or sample). This section, like other U.C.C. provisions con-
sidered, provides for rights only between buyer and seller. Application of such express
warranties against remote suppliers is supported by the authorities cited in note 26
supra.
28. See note 26 supra.
29. Id.
30. Although the express warranty exception to the privity rule is widely ac-
cepted, some authorities have criticized it as an artificial attempt to find a consensual
duty where none actually exists. These authorities would prefer to base the remote
supplier's liability on his breach of a straightforward duty imposed by law on a strict
tort or implied warranty theory. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 20,
403 P.2d 145, 152-53, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24-25 (1965) (concurring and dissenting opinion
by Justice Peters pointing out that there had been no reliance on the remote supplier's
representations); Economic Loss, supra note 24, at 922 ("absent actual reliance, the
existence of representations to the public by the manufacturer is merely a makeweight
factor, and liability could more logically be predicated on implied warranty or strict
tort theories.") (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 14, 403 P.2d 145, 148-49,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20-21 (1965) (buyer not required to elect between return of purchase
price and consequential damages remedies as required by the Uniform Sales Act).
32. See Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th
Cir. 1974) (citing Ohio's enactment of § 2-714 of the U.C.C. as the statute controlling
buyer's recovery in a suit against a remote supplier). See text accompanying notes 39-
47 infra.
33. U.C.C. § 2-714 provides in part,
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requires nonprivy warrantors to honor their express warranties, 3
and Minnesota case law indicates that the U.C.C. is the source of
remedies for breach of non-privy express warranties. 5 It appears,
therefore, that Minnesota would follow the majority view and permit
a consumer-buyer to sue a remote supplier for breach of express
warranty and to recover economic loss under section 2-714.36
Although absence of privity of contract does not prevent a buyer
from recovering loss of bargain damages from an express warrantor
under U.C.C section 2-714, courts have not allowed non-privy buyers
to recover the retail purchase price through the Code's alternative
remedy of revocation of acceptance under section 2-608, 1 despite the
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notification ... he
may recover as damages for any non-conformity of tender the loss resulting
in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as determined in any
manner which is reasonable.
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted
and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted, unless
special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount.
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential damages under
the next section may also be recovered.
34. MINN. STAT. § 325.953(2) (1978) provides,
Honoring of express warranties. The maker of an express warranty aris-
ing of a consumer sale in this state shall honor the terms of the express
warranty. In a consumer sale, the manufacturer shall honor an express war-
ranty made by the manufacturer; the distributor shall honor an express
warranty made by the distributor; and the retail seller shall honor an express
warranty made by the retail seller.
This statute is not a part of Minnesota's enactment of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and the Durfee court did not rely on it. Section 325.954 provides special
remedies for violation of § 325.953(2), but also specifically provides that this "shall not
be construed as restricting any remedy that is otherwise available." MINN. STAT. §
325.954 (1978). Although there is no case law guidance on this question, § 325.953(2)
does allow buyers to proceed directly against non-privy express warrantors who breach
their warranties, and § 325.954 may be interpreted to provide specific legislative au-
thority for use of U.C.C. remedies. In any event, the Minnesota court appears to allow
non-privy actions against express warrantors under the U.C.C. without specific legisla-
tive mandate. See note 35 infra.
35. See, e.g., Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn.
1978) (awarding consequential damages under § 2-715(2)(b) to a professional barn
painter where defective paint provided by the remote paint manufacturer faded on his
customer's buildings constituting a breach of both express and implied warranties).
36. Although no reported Minnesota case has reached this issue in isolation,
there is little doubt that economic loss is recoverable from an express warrantor, even
in the absence of privity. In Durfee, the court observed that "[i]f plaintiff had sued
Saab-Scania for breach of. . . express warranty. . . .the absence of privity would
not bar the suit despite the language of the pertinent Code sections." 262 N.W.2d at
357.
37. Two cases might be read to support application of § 2-608 against remote
suppliers. Volvo of America Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977); Gauthier v.
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fact that section 2-714 is drafted in terms of "buyers" and "sellers"
just as is section 2-608.31 For example, in Voytovich v. Bangor Punta
Operations, Inc.,39 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Ohio
law, held that U.C.C. section 2-608 could not be invoked against the
non-privy defendant, as it "was not the seller."40 Nevertheless, the
court affirmed the trial court's alternative judgment for loss of bar-
gain damages under U.C.C. section 2-714 against the non-privy ex-
press warrantor.4
The court's refusal to allow buyers of substantially impaired
goods to revoke acceptance against remote defendants under section
Mayo, 77 Mich. App. 513, 258 N.W.2d 748 (1977). Both of these cases upheld trial court
orders applying § 2-608 against non-privy suppliers. Both indicated, however, that they
did so only because the substantial result would not have differed had the lower court
applied the correct law. In Wells, both dealer and distributor were joined as defendants
and the dealer had received a directed verdict on a plea for indemnity against the
distributor. On these facts the question of privity was purely academic since "the result
would have been the same as far as Volvo is concerned." 551 S.W.2d at 829. In
Gauthier, the court analyzed the case in terms of products liability law, which clearly
established the remote supplier's liability for the defective product, measured by the
purchase price less salvage value, but did not entitle the buyer to return the goods and
recover the price. 77 Mich. App. at 515-16, 258 N.W.2d at 749-50. Although the court
"d[id] not see this case as one for revocation of acceptance," id. at 515, 258 N.W.2d
at 749, it affirmed the trial court, noting that the trial judge had reached a
"substantially equivalent result," reducing damages to account for salvage value by
ordering the manufacturer to take possession of the defective goods. Id. at 516, 258
N.W.2d at 750. Thus, neither Wells nor Gauthier is comparable to the Durfee court's
direct and explicit application of § 2-608 against a non-privy defendant. Cf. 262
N.W.2d at 357-58 (direct application of revocation of acceptance as a remedy).
38, Compare MIm. STAT. § 336.2-714(1)(1978) ("Where the buyer has accepted
goods . . . , he may recover as damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss
resulting. . . from the seller's breach. . . .") (emphasis added) with MINN. STAT. §
336.2-608(2) (1978) ("Revocation of acceptance . . . is not effective until the buyer
notifies the seller of it.") (emphasis added).
39. 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 1211.
41. Id. ("there can be no dispute that Voytovich had a right to sue the manufac-
turer, and to recover damages for breach of express warranty [under section 2-
714(2)]."). In so holding, the Sixth Circuit panel relied on two Ohio cases-Inglis v.
American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E. 2d 583 (1965), Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958)-holding privity unnec-
essary. See 494 F.2d at 1211. Other courts facing the question have reached similar
results. See, e.g., Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144
(1976); Curtis v. Fordham Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 566, 364 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1975); Cooper v. Mason, 14 N.C. 472, 188 S.E.2d 653 (1972)(by implication); Emmons
v, Durable Mobile Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Reece v. Yeager
Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W.Va. 461, 184 S.E.2d 727 (1971). In'none of these cases, however,
was it clear that the buyers would have been entitled to recover loss of bargain damages
under § 2-714.
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2-608 limits their Code remedy to that provided by section 2-714.11
Sections 2-608 and 2-714 provide different measures of recovery for
similar wrongs. 3 While both sections allow recovery of incidental and
consequential damages," under section 2-714, the loss of bargain
damages are measured by the difference between the value the goods
would have if they were as warranted-usually the purchase
price-and the value of the defective goods.45 Even if the defects
substantially impair the usefulness of the goods to the consumer, the
diminution in value is all that can be recovered under this section.'
Moreover, the consumer has the burden of disposing of or selling the
defective goods for which he often has no use.4" On the other hand, if
the consumer is permitted to revoke his acceptance of the defective
goods under section 2-608, the full purchase price can be recovered
under section 2-711,11 and the burden of disposing of the goods is
shifted to the seller." Consequently, section 2-608 is, from the con-
sumer's point of view, a more desirable remedy."
In Durfee, the court permitted the plaintiff to revoke acceptance
against a remote supplier under section 2-608 and, upon return of the
defective automobile, to recover the full retail purchase price in addi-
tion to incidental damages." In justifying its holding, the court stated
42. Compare U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (allowing buyers who justifiably revoke accept-
ance under § 2-608 to recover the full purchase price) with id. at § 2-714 (restricting
buyers who have irrevocably accepted goods to recovery of loss-of-bargain).
43. Liability under both sections is predicated on the failure of the goods to
conform to the obligations under the contract. Compare note 4 supra with note 33
supra.
44. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1)(b), -713(1), -714(3).
45. See U.C.C. § 2-714(2).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (right to recover the price arises only "[w]here the
seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably
revokes acceptance").
47. It is apparent that the seller, who is in the business of dealing in the goods,
has better market access and marketing skills than the consumer buyer. Casting the
burden of realizing the salvage value of the goods on the consumer is economically
inefficient due to the consumer's probable higher transactional costs and lesser ability
to optimize recovery on the sale of the defective goods. See generally Phillips, supra
note 9, at 354.
48. See note 42 supra.
49. See U.C.C. § 2-711(1). Cf. note 47 supra (burden on buyer under U.C.C. §
2-714).
50. See generally J. WHrE & R. SuMMERs, supra note 7, § 8-3, at 253-66; Phillips,
supra note 9 at 354.
Theoretically, both remedies make the buyer whole. In practice, however, the
consumer buyer is better served under § 2-608. The non-privy buyer's damages under
§ 2-714 would be inadequate in the sense that the damages he received would be
diminished by the salvage value of the defective goods when the defect substantially
impaired their value.
51. 262 N.W.2d at 357-58. See notes 5, 7 supra.
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that distributors warrant their automobiles in order to increase indi-
rectly their own sales to their dealers, and that consumers rely on
such warranties in making their purchase decisions. The court further
noted that breach of such express or implied warranties would have
provided plaintiff with a cause of action for ordinary damages under
the authority of prior decisions, despite language in the relevant
U.C.C. sections describing the right to recovery in terms of "buyers"
and "sellers."52 Relying on the mandated liberal administration of
Code remedies,53 the court reasoned that when the breaches of war-
ranty were severe enough to amount to "substantial impairment,"
the buyer should not be precluded from securing the advantages of
his revocation of acceptance remedy merely because of the insolvency
or nonavailability of the immediate seller.54 The court therefore im-
posed liability on the remote supplier stating that "the distributor
. . . ., who profits indirectly from retail sales, must take responsibil-
ity for the solvency of its dealers when its warranty is breached."55
Although apparently unique among cases decided under the
U.C.C., the court's abolition of the privity requirement in an action
for recovery of the purchase price is not without precedent. Durfee
finds support in a closely analogous line of non-U.C.C. Louisiana
cases. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, a buyer is permitted to return
defective goods to the seller and to recover the purchase price when
he is able to meet roughly the same burdens imposed on the revoking
buyer by section 2-608 of the U.C.C. 5 Beginning in 1972 with Media
52. 262 N.W.2d at 357. See also note 38 supra and accompanying text.
53. Id. (citing Mn. STAT. § 336.1-106(1) (1978): "The remedies provided by this
chapter shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed . . ").
54. 262 N.W.2d at 357. Although the court did not explicitly state that the dealer
was insolvent, it evidently was concerned about the dealer's financial ability to meet
judgment. The dealer did not participate in the appeal, either by brief or argument,
id. at 352, and Saab-Scania was unable to assure the court at oral argument of the
dealer's continued existence. Id. at 357.
55. Id. at 357-58.
56. The articles relevant to this discussion provide, "The seller, who knows the
vice of the thing he sells and omits to declare it, besides the restitution of price and
repayment of the expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, is answerable to the
buyer in damages." LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West Supp. 1978). See Lovett, State
Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REv. 724 (1972). "Redhibition" is the
nature of the wrong:
Redhibition is the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect
in the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so
inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would
not have purchased it, had he known of the vice.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2520 (West 1973) (emphasis in original).
Although cast in very different language, both U.C.C. § 2-608 (revocation of ac-
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Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,
Inc.," Louisiana courts have permitted this action to be brought
against remote suppliers of defective goods." They have done so de-
spite the fact that the Louisiana Civil Code, like the U.C.C., refers
only to "buyer" and "seller" and nowhere defines "seller" to include
a supplier of goods. 9
A functionally similar result was reached under the Uniform
Sales Act by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Beck v. Spindler," a
decision which, although not specifically relied on by the Durfee court
ceptance) and article 2545 of the Louisiana Civil Code (redhibition) allow cancellation
of the buyer's contractual obligations with return of the purchase price in addition to
damages. Redhibition allows an additional recovery of attorney's fees. The language
employed in the redhibition articles is archaic and is not given its apparent meaning
by the Louisiana courts. Judicial interpretation of the definition of "redhibitory de-
fect" contained in article 2520 is very similar to judicial interpretations of
"nonconformity substantially impairing value" contained in § 2-608. Compare Prince
v. Paretti Pontiac Co., 281 So. 2d 112, 115 (La. 1973) (automobile transmission that
was "irregular and unusually noisy" and would not shift properly into low gear or
reverse held to have redhibitory defect) with Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99
N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968) (defective transmission requiring replacement
held to substantially impair value of vehicle justifying revocation of acceptance). Al-
though article 2545 seems to require knowledge of the defect on the part of the seller,
judicial interpretation has created a conclusive presumption that manufacturers know
of the defects in their products. See Smith v. Max Thieme Chevrolet Co., 315 So. 2d
82, 86 (La. App. 1975); Gonzales v. Southwest Mobile Homes, Inc., 309 So. 2d 780,
785-86 (La. App. 1975).
57. 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972) (plaintiff permitted to return defective
Mercedes automobile and recover purchase price from remote distributor when dealer
was defunct at time of suit).
58. Cases following Media in permitting a recovery under article 2545 without
privity include Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840, 845 (La. 1974); Smith v. Max Thieme
Chevrolet Co., 315 So. 2d 82, 86 (La. App. 1975). Accord, Moreno's, Inc. v. Lake
Charles Catholic High School, Inc., 302 So. 2d 724, 725 (La. App. 1974). But see
Doughty v. General Motors Corp., 303 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 1974); Richard v. Smith
Eng'r Works, Inc., 297 So. 2d 437 (La. App. 1974). In Doughty and Richard, privity
was held to be a requirement, but since both dealt with injured plaintiffs who were
not buyers, these cases seem to stand for the proposition that one must have purchased
the defective goods in order to reach defendants up the chain of distribution. See
Robertson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Products in Louisiana Law, 50 Tim.
L. REv. 50, 86-88 (1975).,
59. Compare U.C.C. § 2-608 with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2545 (West Supp.
1978). Beyond the similarities between the respective judicial interpretations of these
two statutes, Media takes remote supplier liability for the purchase price further than
Durfee. While Durfee involved an express warranty, Media, being predicated on an
implied warranty concept, applies regardless of any express representations. See Rob-
ertson, supra note 58, at 82-86. There are, however, indications in Durfee that revoca-
tion of acceptance may be available to the consumer where a remote supplier breached
only an implied warranty. See notes 88-113 infra and accompanying text.
60. 256 Minn. 543, 558-63, 99 N.W.2d 670, 680-83 (1959).
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for this purpose," also supports the abolition of the privity require-
ment in an action for the purchase price. In Beck, a 1959 case, a buyer
of defective goods brought an action against both the retail seller and
the remote manufacturer for rescission of the sales contract and re-
covery of the purchase price. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed
the judgment against both the privy retailer 2 and the non-privy man-
ufacturer. 3 Because an action for rescission of contract under the
Uniform Sales Act is similar in some respects to revocation of accept-
ance under the Uniform Commercial Code,"' the Beck court's disre-
gard of the absence of privity in an action for return of the retail price
61. The Durfee court cited Beck only for the proposition that plaintiff could have
maintained a suit against Saab-Scania for breach of implied warranty. See 262 N.W.2d
at 357.
62. 256 Minn. 565, 567, 99 N.W. 2d 684, 686 (1959) (companion case, affirming
trial court's judgment against retail dealer).
63. 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959). Beck involved a plaintiff who pur-
chased a house trailer from a local dealer, who had obtained it from an out-of-state
manufacturer. The trailer proved to be wholly unsuited to the rigors of a northern
Minnesota winter; an inadequate heating system and insulation caused condensation
and extensive water damage rendering the trailer uninhabitable despite the best efforts
of both the dealer and manufacturer. Plaintiff, after being evicted by the holder of the
conditional sales contract, sued to recover the payments made. After a jury verdict
against both defendants, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by
attempting to repair the trailer, the manufacturer "assumed contractual obligations
to the purchaser and [became] a seller within the meaning of [the Uniform] Sales
Act." Id. at 563-64, 99 N.W.2d at 683-84 (1959). This appears to be a finding of privity-
in-fact. Dean Prosser, however, apparently understood liability in Beck to have been
predicated on express and implied warranties, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,
supra note 24, at 792 n.4, and the Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently cited
Beck for the general proposition that privity is not required for suits for breach of
"implied warranty." See, e.g., Durfee v. Rod Baxter, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn.
1977); Milbank Mutual Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 114-15, 244 N.W.2d 105,
109 (1976); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 340, 154 N.W.2d 488, 501
(1967).
64. Rescission, like revocation of acceptance, was an action entitling the ag-
grieved buyer to recover the price paid upon return of defective goods. See note 65
infra. There are, however, two important differences: First, the revoking buyer under
the U.C.C. must show that the defects in the goods substantially impair their value,
see notes 4, 8 supra, but rescission was available under the Uniform Sales Act as a
remedy for any breach of warranty. See note 65 infra. Second, the revoking buyer is
entitled to recover consequential and incidental damages in addition to the price under
the U.C.C., see note 6 supra, the rescinding buyer, by contrast, was limited, under the
Uniform Sales Act, to recovery of the price paid. See note 65 infra. Hence, under the
Uniform Sales Act, the buyer of defective goods had to elect his remedy, choosing
between recovery of the purchase price in an action for rescission and recovery of loss
of bargain, consequential, and incidental damages in a suit for breach of warranty. Id.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, the revoking buyer must prove that the defects
in the goods substantially impair their value, but once he has done so, he may recover
both the price and damages. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
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against a remote supplier provides some precedent for Durfee.
Durfee is also consistent with the Code's abolition of the old
election of remedies rule. Under that rule, a feature of both the com-
mon law and the Uniform Sales Act," a buyer of defective goods had
to make an often difficult choice: he could retain the goods, thereby
affirming the contract, and seek loss of bargain, consequential, and
incidental damages in a breach of warranty action, or he could repu-
diate the contract by returning the goods, and bring an action for
rescission, in which case his recovery would be limited to restitution
of the purchase price." Because the theory of the action for recovery
of the purchase price was unjust enrichment,67 a rescinding consumer
could recover no more than what the defendant had gained-the
retail purchase price." Consequential and incidental damages could
65. See MINN. STAT. § 512.69(1)(b), (1)(d), (2) (1961) (Minnesota corrollary to §
69 of the Uniform Sales Act), repealed by Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 811, § 336.10-102,
1965 Minn. Laws 1484.
66. See generally Comment, Sales-Remedies of Buyer-Right to Rescind and
Recover Damages Upon Breach of Warranty, 21 MiN. L. Rav. 111, 112 (1936).
67. In considering an action for rescission of a sales contract for breach of war-
ranty under Minnesota's enactment of the Uniform Sales Act, see note 65 supra, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held,
The right of the vendee to recover sums paid under a rescinded contract
does not rest on the agreement. Rather is it grounded on the theory that the
vendor, having obtained money under a contract made void by rescission, is
unjustly enriched at the vendee's expense and, as a consequence, should be
subjected to a legal duty to restore that which has been improperly gained.
Kavli v. Leifman, 207 Minn. 549, 553, 292 N.W. 210, 213 (1940); see Seifert v. Union
Brass & Metal Mfg. Co., 191 Minn. 362, 364-65, 254 N.W.273, 274 (1934). See gener-
ally, RESTATE MENT oF REsTrrTUTON § 1, Comments a-e (1937). For a historical perspec-
tive, see id. at 1-10 (introductory note). Unjust enrichment was by no means the sole
theory under which courts awarded restitutionary recoveries to rescinding buyers at
common law or under the Uniform Sales Act. By the twentieth century, this theory
was rapidly becoming a historic artifact and courts most often spoke merely of a right
of recovery. See Anderson, Quasi Contractual Recovery in the Law of Sales, 21 MINN.
L. Rzv. 529, 535-38 n.18 (1937) (collecting all reported cases from American courts in
which buyer successfully sued for the price upon seller's breach of warranty).
68. Noting that many courts were awarding incidental and consequential dam-
ages despite the Sales Act's limitation of the rescinding buyer's remedy to recovery of
the purchase price, Professor Anderson observed,
Where a buyer who rescind[s] for breach of warranty ... [is] allowed
to recover not only his part payment of price but also expenses or damages
incurred-the recovery of the expenses or damages cannot be justified on any
doctrine of unjust enrichment because the expense or damage to the buyer
does not enrich the seller ....
[T]hese cases may be dismissed as being merely "wrong" decisions, but
[their] number. . . perhaps indicates . . . new rules of law are being cre-
ated.
Anderson, supra note 67, at 568-69. The principle of these "wrong" cases noted by
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not be recovered.6'
The drafters of the U.C.C. recognized that, regardless of the
remedy, an action for defective goods was contractual in nature; thus,
in fashioning the new revocation of acceptance remedy, they permit-
ted the revoking buyer to recover consequential and incidental dam-
ages in addition to the purchase price. 70 In a breach of warranty
action, therefore, the U.C.C. puts the revocation of acceptance rem-
edy under section 2-608 on the same footing as the loss of bargain
remedy under section 2-714."1 Similarly, Durfee treats these two rem-
edies consistently by extending the limited abrogation of the privity
requirement in breach of warranty actions 2 to cover actions for recov-
ery of the purchase price upon return of the defective goods. By
allowing a plaintiff to revoke acceptance and recover the purchase
Professor Anderson in 1937 was finally codifed into the remedy of revocation of accept-
ance in the Uniform Commercial Code. See note 71 infra.
69. In reversing a common law case in which the trial court had awarded dam-
ages for fraud in addition to restitution on rescission of the contract, the Minnesota
Supreme Court explained the basic principle behind the buyer's forced election of
remedies:
[T]he very rescission for which plaintiff contends and which he established
below bars any claim for damages for the fraud inducing him to make the
purchase which he has rescinded. A defrauded party cannot both rescind the
contract, recovering incidentally what he has parted with, and at the same
time recover damages for fraud. The damage in such a case comes from the
fact that the defrauded party is induced to bind himself by the contract. By
rescission he nullifies and so escapes the contract and in consequence there
is no damage.
Scheer v. F.P. Harbaugh Co., 165 Minn. 54, 56, 205 N.W. 626, 627 (1925). But see
Waldman Produce, Inc. v. Frigidaire Corp., 157 Misc. 438, 284 N.Y.S. 167 (1935) (court
allowed a rescinding buyer of a defective refrigerator to recover both the payments
made and the value of spoiled produce). The result in the New York court's Waldman
decision was logically supported by distinguishing between loss of bargain damages
and the classes of incidental and consequential damages. Since loss of bargain damages
logically required a bargain, rescission remained inconsistent with a claim for loss of
bargain damages and recovery could not be had. Incidental and consequential dam-
ages, however, arose from the buyer's reliance on the seller's misrepresentation or the
seller's failure to perform as warranted and so logically did not require a continuing
contractual obligation. See Comment, supra note 66, at 113.
70. See note 6 supra; U.C.C. § 2-714(3).
71. The Official Comments to § 2-608 provide:
[T]he buyer is no longer required to elect between revocation of acceptance
and recovery of damages for breach. Both are now available to him. The non-
alternative character of the two remedies is stressed by the terms used in the
present section. The section no longer speaks of "rescission," a term capable
of ambiguous application .... The remedy under this section is instead
referred to simply as "revocation of acceptance" of goods tendered under a
contract for sale and involves no suggestion of "election" of any sort.
U.C.C. § 2-608, Official Comment 1.
72. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
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price against a remote supplier, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
corrected the imbalance between the two remedies that was reflected
in the Voytovich case. 3
In addition to furthering the no-election policy of U.C.C. section
2-608,71 the Durfee decision is also consistent with an action to recover
the purchase price under the U.C.C. Formerly, since such an action
was based on the theory of unjust enrichment, 5 it could not be
claimed that the non-privy wholesaler had been unjustly enriched to
the full extent of the retail purchase price.7 6 Under the U.C.C., how-
ever, unjust enrichment can no longer be the basis of such an action
since the buyer is now entitled to recover all of his damages, even if
they exceed the purchase price.7 Instead, the action is based on the
"nonconformity" of the goods-the functional equivalent of a breach
of warranty.78 Entitling the buyer to recover the purchase price on a
showing that the defects are severe enough to substantially impair
the value of the goods, reflects the Code's policy of shifting the bur-
den of realizing the salvage value of the goods to the seller when the
breach of warranty is sufficiently grave. 9 Both sections 2-608 and 2-
714 provide remedies based on the warrantor's breach of his contrac-
tual duty to deliver conforming goods. Because an action seeking
recovery of the purchase price no longer depends on the theory of
unjust enrichment, the Durfee court was justified in affording it the
same treatment with respect to the privity requirement as the loss of
bargain remedy for breach of warranty under section 2-714.
73. See text accompanying notes 39-47 supra.
74. See note 71 supra.
75. See notes 66-69 supra and accompanying text.
76. The dealer's markup could not constitute unjust enrichment to a remote
supplier who has received only the wholesale price. Courts have usually held that an
action for rescission under either the common law or the Uniform Sales Act could not
be maintained against a non-privy supplier. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Earnst,
279 Ala. 299, 184 So. 2d 811 (1966) (interpreting the Uniform Sales Act); Kyker v.
General Motors Corp., 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964) (same). See also Voytovich v.
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974) (decision based on Ohio
law finding there could be no revocation of acceptance without privity, and holding
that there could be no rescission under the common law). But see Beck v. Spindler,
256 Minn. 543, 564, 99 N.W.2d 670, 684 (1959) (court held, without elaboraton, that
rescission under the Uniform Sales Act was only "incidental" to the right to recover
for the remote manufacturer's breach of warranty).
77. See note 5 supra.
78. Both § 2-608 and § 2-714 describe the buyer's right to recovery as arising from
"nonconformities." See notes 4, 33 supra. "Conforming" is defined in § 2-106(2):
"Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 'conforming' or conform
to the contract when they are in accordance with the obligations under the contract."
U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1978).
79. See notes 7, 47-50 supra and accompanying text.
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Although it may seem to go beyond the legislature's intent to
apply section 2-608-which refers only to "sellers"-against a remote
supplier, similar wording has not prevented application of section 2-
714 to suits against parties not in privity.5 5 Indeed, the concept of
privity seems overly technical when a supplier has expressly war-
ranted the goods to the ultimate consumer;8 the same considerations
that justified abolition of the privity requirement in express warranty
actions apply with equal force regardless of whether the buyer is
seeking his loss of bargain or the return of the purchase price. 2 If
anything, the case for abolishing the privity requirement for actions
under section 2-608 is stronger; if privity is not required to recover
damages for an ordinary breach of warranty, there can be no justifica-
tion for denying the Code-mandated revocation of acceptance remedy
when the breach of warranty is so severe as to constitute substantial
impairment.
When a remote supplier fails to provide goods that conform to
his warranties, therefore, he may be subject to liability depending on
the degree of nonconformity. If the nonconformity is relatively minor,
the supplier will be liable only for damages under section 2-714. But,
if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods and
the buyer is able to meet the other requirements of section 2-608, the
buyer will have the alternative of revoking his acceptance and re-
80. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 30 supra.
82. The diseconomy of requiring formal privity is well illustrated by Klein v.
Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966). In Klein, a seed
manufacturer released a batch of defective tomato seed into the stream of commerce.
Some of the seed was eventually purchased by plaintiff who suffered economic loss
when the seed failed to ripen as warranted. Plaintiff sued the retailer for damages
under the Uniform Sales Act. The retailer cross-claimed against the distributor which
cross-claimed against the seed broker which cross-claimed against the manufacturer.
Each party recovered judgment against its privy and all judgments were affirmed with
costs to the manufacturer. Id. at 103-04, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The overall cost of
achieving this result would have been lower had the ultimate consumer had a clear
right to proceed directly against the remote manufacturer.
The retail automobile dealer has been held to have a right to indemnity from the
distributor when he has been held liable to the consumer under U.C.C. § 2-608. See,
e.g., Volvo of America Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826 (Ky. 1977) (dealer received
directed verdict against distributor on cross-claim seeking indemnification of judg-
ment awarded buyer); see also, Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d
954 (1978) (court noted a contractural indemnity agreement between dealer and manu-
facturer and, while affirming the consumer's judgment under U.C.C. § 2-608 against
only the privy dealer, assumed that the indemnity agreement would shift the burden
of this judgment to the manufacturer). These cases achieve the Durfee court's result
of holding the remote supplier ultimately liable for the U.C.C. § 2-608 mandated
measure of damages, but require the expense of involving the retailer in the suit and
would not be possible where, as in Durfee, the retail dealer is not available.
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covering the purchase price and consequential and incidental dam-
ages from the remote supplier, who will then have the burden of
disposing of the goods.
Durfee leaves unanswered the question of what circumstances
will justify invoking section 2-608 against a non-privy defendant. The
court reached its decision on the assumption that plaintiff's immedi-
ate vendor was insolvent and would be unavailable to meet judg-
ment.13 Since the court placed some emphasis on the dealer's as-
sumed insolvency as a justification for its result, one might question
whether revocation of acceptance will be available against remote
suppliers in any other circumstances. There does not appear to be any
legal principle that supports such a limitation. If the distributor's
liability results from its breach of its duties as a warrantor of the
goods, 4 and not from an expedient search for a "deep pocket" regard-
less of legal duty, liability should be imposed without considering the
financial status of other parties to the sale. Media85 and the Louisiana
cases may be indicative of future developments in Minnesota. Al-
though Media, like Durfee, was decided in circumstances in which
the immediate seller was assumed to be unavailable to meet judg-
ment," subsequent Louisiana cases have taken the proper approach
and applied liability regardless of the availability of alternative de-
fendants. 7 Durfee should be interpreted to permit direct suits under
section 2-608 against remote suppliers without regard to the solvency
or availability of the immediate seller.
The Durfee court's reasoning raises yet another issue that has not
been resolved in Minnesota: whether a consumer buyer can obtain
relief directly against a remote supplier on an implied warranty
theory when only economic loss is involved. This issue was not
reached in Durfee because Saab-Scania expressly warranted the vehi-
cle to be "free from defects."" The court, however, did not explicitly
limit application of the revocation of acceptance remedy against re-
mote suppliers to cases involving express warranty. 9 Furthermore, in
83. 262 N.W.2d at 357. See note 45 supra.
84. See 262 N.W.2d at 357 ("we think the buyer is entitled to look to the warran-
tor for relief.").
85. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262
La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972), discussed at notes 57-59 supra and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 87, 262 So. 2d at 380.
87. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Smith v. Max Thieme
Chevrolet Co., 315 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1975). In these cases, both the manufacturer
and dealer were defendants, and there was no indication that the privy defendants
were unable to meet judgments.
88. See note 11 supra.
89. The court's reference to "implied warranty" as an alternative theory of recov-
ery, 262 N.W.2d at 357, suggests that Saab's status as an express warrantor was not
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justifying its application of section 2-608 against a remote seller, the
court intimated that lack of privity would have been no obstacle,
even had there been no express warranty: "If plaintiff had sued Saab-
Scania for breach of either express warranty or implied warranty, the
absence of privity would not bar the suit despite the language of the
pertinent Code sections.""
Should this dictum be followed, a non-privy buyer will be able
to sue for breach of implied warranty to recover damages for purely
economic loss." This result would be a substantial development in
Minnesota law, for it would, in essence, hold non-privy defendants
strictly liable for such loss.'2 Whether purely economic loss may be
recovered on an implied warranty or strict tort liability theory93 in the
essential to plaintiff's recovery. See note 90 infra and accompanying text. This appears
to be the court's construction, despite the fact that it referred to Saab-Scandia's
express warranty in a footnote, 262 N.W.2d at 353 n.3, defined the good's nonconform-
ity in terms of this express representation, id., and referred to Saab-Scandia as the
"warrantor" of the automobile in assessing liability. Id. at 357.
90. 262 N.W.2d at 357 (emphasis added) (citing McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
278 Minn. 322, 337, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499 (1967) (express warranty held sufficient to
support non-privy liability in a personal injury case); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,
557, 99 N.W.2d 670, 679 (1959) (implied warranty held sufficient to support non-privy
liability for economic loss)). The Durfee court also cited, with a "See generally" intro-
ductory signal, Milbank Mutual Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 114, 244 N.W.2d
105, 109 (1976) (U.C.C. § 2-318 held to create liability for damage to property of father
whose daughter was buyer of defectively fireproofed Christmas tree).
91. For an explanation of the term "economic loss" as used in this Comment,
see note 25 supra.
92. Liability for breach of implied warranty is, in essence, strict liability. See
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965);
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A, comment m (1965); Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel, supra note 26, at 800. See also note 99 infra. Although characterization of a
products liability claim as a contract or tort action may have significance, see Note,
Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Be-
tween Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118 (1978), both the strict liability and
implied warranty theories of recovery may impose liability without proof of fault.
93. The classic formulation of the requirements and nature of the non-privy
implied warranty or strict tort liability theory of recovery may be found in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs:
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User
or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
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absence of privity of contract remains a highly controversial issue;
even after years of debate, there is a split of authority on the ques-
tion." Although strict liability has been almost universally imposed
on non-privy defendants when defective goods have caused personal
injury 5 or property damage,96 there has been considerable reluctance
to extend the implied warranty/strict tort liability theory of recovery
to cases involving mere economic loss, especially the loss of bargain
damages traditionally relegated to the law of contracts. Prior Min-
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965).
An official comment to § 402A makes it clear that warranty defenses no longer
play a role in these product liability actions. Id., comment m, at 355-56.
The U.C.C. has endorsed the principle of § 402A through three alternative formu-
lations of § 2-318 that provide a cause of action to "third party beneficiaries" of both
express and implied warranties. Alternative A extends coverage only to the family,
household, or guests of the buyer for personal injuries. Alternative B extends this
protection to "any natural person who may reasonably be expected to. .. be affected
by the goods." Alternative C extends this coverage to the same class, but also extends
liability to cover any "injury." All three alternatives state that this liability cannot
be excluded or limited by the seller, but Alternative C applies this prohibition only to
injury "to the person." U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978). Alternative C has been adopted in
Minnesota. Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 621, § 6, 1969 Minn. Laws 1064-65 (effective July
1, 1969). It is the most liberal of the three alternatives from the consumer perspective
and it appears that it would be possible to interpret "injury" broadly enough to include
economic loss. The official comments, however, indicate that recovery under § 2-318
is governed by tort rather than contract principles. The official comments explain that
"the third alternative . . . follow[s] the trend of modern decisions as indicated by
[the] Restatement of Torts 2d § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1965) in extending the
rule beyond injuries to the person [as amended in 1966]." U.C.C. § 2-318, Official
Comment 3 (1978). This comment's endorsement of § 402A which applies only to
personal injury and property damage, indicates that § 2-318 was not intended to govern
cases in which a plaintiff's "injury" was merely that the product was not worth the
price paid. See J. WHrlE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 11-5, at 333.
94. Compare note 102 infra with note 103 infra. See generally Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 805-48; Robertson, supra note 58 at 78-79 n.145.
95. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 793-99.
96. See, e.g., Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94
(1966) (buyer entitled to go to the jury on strict liability theory when newly purchased
automobile caught fire and was destroyed but buyer suffered no personal injury).
97. See, e.g., Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 209 N.W.2d 643 (Neb. 1973).
In Hawkins, defective scaffolding collapsed, causing property damage to the scaffold
itself and other property. Although the court permitted recovery for the other property
damage in line with the Restatement position, recovery for the product itself was not
allowed. The court stated,
[W]e feel that the doctrine~of strict tort liability was not conceived as a
substitute for warranty liability in cases where the purchaser has only lost
the benefit of his bargain. . . .We perceive no sound reason for extending
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nesota case law has given inconsistent indications on this issue,"8 but
no recent Minnesota case has explicitly held a non-privy defendant
strictly liable merely for the loss of bargain damages and trivial inci-
dental expenses that are typified in the Durfee case."
the doctrine of strict tort liability to the point where it emasculates the law
of sales and the Uniform Commercial Code ....
Id. at 653.
98. Minnesota's position on the Santor-Seely issue, see notes 102-103 infra and
accompanying text, has not yet been clarified. In Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99
N.W.2d 670 (1959), decided under the Uniform Sales Act, the court apparently held
the remote manufacturer of a defective house trailer liable for loss of bargain to a non-
privy consumer buyer on an implied warranty theory, but ambiguities in the court's
opinion and the fact that Beck predated clear articulation of the strict liability theory
in products actions raises doubts about Beck's continuing effect. See note 63 supra.
Subsequent cases have given some indications that Minnesota would follow the Seely
position. In McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967), the
court formally adopted the strict tort liability rule in language quite clearly limiting
the doctrine to cases involving personal injuries. Id. at 337-40, 154 N.W.2d at 499-501.
One federal court has explicitly held that Minnesota law does not permit a plain-
tiff who has suffered only economic loss to sue in strict tort liability. Noel Trans. &
Pkg. Del. Serv., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968, 970-71 (D. Minn. 1972)
(memorandum and order granting manufacturer's motion for summary judgment on
issue of strict tort liability for commercial loss but denying motion on express and
implied warranty grounds). Although the Noel court gave no reasoned explanation of
its distinction between the strict tort and implied warranty theories, the courts of the
Eighth Circuit appear to have accepted the Noel holding as an accurate representation
of Minnesota law. See Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 490 F.2d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 1974)
(citing Noel as the Minnesota rule); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Industries, Inc. 395
F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (citing Noel as the Minnesota rule). The Minnesota
Supreme Court, however, has continued to cite Beck with apparent approval, see e.g.,
Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106, 115, 244 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1976);
McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 340, 154 N.W.2d 488, 501 (1967), and
has never clearly distinguished between express and implied warranty theories in
products liability actions. See, e.g., Chatfield v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 266 N.W.2d
171 (Minn. 1978) (remote manufacturer's breach of both express and implied warran-
ties found, but court did not specify which theory of recovery it relied on in holding
defendant liable; court did not mention the apparent lack of privity).
99. The Minnesota court specifically adopted strict tort liability for cases involv-
ing property damage in Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Proksch, 309 Minn. 106,244 N.W.2d
105 (1976) (defectively fireproofed Christmas tree caused fire damaging house), but has
not faced the more difficult question of pure loss of bargain since Beck. See note 98
supra. The Proksch court's expansive dictums, however, might be read as abolishing
the concept of contractual privity in product defect cases:
The result of McCormack was to bring warranty, negligence, and strict tort
liability theories of product liability into harmony to protect consumers and
ultimate users from dangerous defective products. An important part of the
harmony thus achieved was the abolition of privity as a defense in actions
involving any of those theories.
Id. at 115, 244 N.W.2d at 10 (footnote omitted). Even this expansive dictum, however,
falls short of holding strict liability for loss of bargain for a mere cosmetic defect. See
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
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Whether the implied warranty or strict liability theory of recov-
ery will be available to recover loss of bargain damages from a remote
supplier will depend on the resolution of the more fundamental issue
of whether the supplier's duty to the consumer sounds in tort or
contract."' The essential question in these situations is what circum-
stances will justify substituting a judicially mandated standard of
product performance for the standard consensually undertaken by
the supplier. The intense debate over this question 0 ' has centered
around the divergent views adopted by the New Jersey and California
Supreme Courts in two leading 1965 cases: Santor v. A & M Karag-
heusian, Inc. 2 and Seely v. White Motor Co."'3
Courts following the Santor view focus on the consumer's lack of
bargaining power."'4 Because consumers generally have no opportun-
100. Because the non-privy defendant's liability under the implied warranty-
strict liability theory of recovery is imposed by law rather than consensual undertak-
ing, it is in essence predicated on on tort theory. Strict products liability originally
emerged as a somewhat extraordinary device to ensure compensation of consumers
where the supplier's negligence was suspected but could not be proved. See Henning-
sen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (non-privy recovery on
implied warranty when car driven by wife of buyer crashed, causing personal injuries
and damaging automobile so badly that negligence could not be proved). Prosser
identifies Henningsen as the origin of strict tort liability although the name "implied
warranty" remained. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 791-800.
In Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), the New
Jersey Supreme Court built on its earlier leading decision in Henningsen and made it
clear that "strict liability in tort" was simply a new name for the non-privy liability
on an implied warranty that it had established in the Henningsen decision. See id. at
66, 207 A.2d at 312 ("the 'strict tort liability' doctrine... [is] 'surely a more accurate
phrase' than breach of implied warranty") (citation omitted). The Restatement ampli-
fies this point: "'[W]arranty' must be given a new and different meaning if it is used
in connection with this section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here stated
as merely one of strict liability in tort." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,
comment m (1965).
One effect of allowing economic loss to be recovered under this tort based theory
is to disable the intricate provisions of the law of contracts that enable the parties to
a sales transaction to distribute the risks inherent in any enterprise by their mutual
agreement. See generally Economic Loss, supra note 24, at 958-64.
101. Compare, e.g., Economic Loss, supra note 24, at 957-58 (warning against
"unforeseen ramifications" of strict liability for non-hazardous loss of bargain) with
Note, supra note 92, at 129 (arguing for unlimited availability for "consumers").
102. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (allowing recovery of loss of bargain damages
on implied warranty/strict tort liability theory when carpet developed cosmetic de-
fects).
103. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (recovery of lost profits
resulting from defective truck would be denied in absence of express warranty) (dic-
tum).
104. For a clear articulation of the "disparity of bargaining power" justification
for the Santor rule, see Seeley v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19-29, 403 P.2d 145,
152-58, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24-30 (1965) (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ity to bargain over the standard of product performance to which the
supplier agrees to be held, these courts prescribe a standard through
their definition of "product defect,"" 5 and impose liability for all loss
occasioned by a breach-regardless of its nature. The consumer's
recovery of loss of bargain is grounded on the same broad considera-
tions of public policy that prompted the development of this theory
of recovery in personal injury cases."°'
Courts following Seely focus instead on the nature of the harm
caused by the product defect." 7 Acknowledging that catastrophic per-
sonal injury or property damage justify imposition of a judicial stan-
dard of product performance, courts following Seely balk at extend-
ing the strict tort liability theory to protect lesser interests."' This
view preserves a role for the consensually based rules in the law of
contracts in the consumer transaction."" The consumer's recovery for
loss of bargain is defined in terms of the bargain;"' he may recover
against a remote supplier only when the goods fail to conform to the
105. The Santor court assessed liability by holding that the manufacturer's im-
plied warranty of merchantability extended to the remote buyer, or, in the alternative,
that the strict tort concept of "defect", see note 93 supra (§ 402A formulation), also
applied to nondangerous "defects." See 44 N.J. at 67, 207 A.2d at 313.
106. The policy justifications courts have put forward center around three basic
ideas seeking to promote the public interest in human safety: first, to the extent that
safer products are possible, strict liability deters suppliers from taking short cuts since
they will have to compensate injury regardless of proof of fault. Second, to the extent
that products cannot be made safer, strict liability will force suppliers to lessen the
impact of inevitable user injury by spreading the loss to the general public through
higher prices reflecting the strict liability risk. Third, to the extent that conventional
warranty doctrines may hold remote suppliers strictly liable through a chain of
suits-each buyer recovering in turn from his privy supplier until the manufacturer is
reached-the direct action promotes judicial economy. See generally Prosser, The Fall
of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 799-800. After consideration of these basic public
policies, the New Jersey Court expanded the scope of the doctrine to include mere loss
of bargain. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,66,207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965)
("In this era of complex marketing practices and assembly line manufacturing condi-
tions, restrictive notions of privity of contract between manufacturer and consumer
must be put aside and the realistic view of strict tort liability adopted.").
The most comprehensive exploration of the countervailing policy issues raised by
this question may be found in a student note published shortly after the Santor and
Seely decisions. See Economic Loss, supra note 24.
107. See Products Liability, supra note 24, at 1070-76.
108. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17, 23 (1965) ("A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with
bearing the risk of physical injury. ... He can, however, be fairly charged with the
risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufac-
turer agrees that it will.")
109. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
110. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26, at 823 ("Loss on the
bargain must depend upon what the bargain is. .. ").
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supplier's express representations.'' This limitation on the implied
warranty or strict tort theory of recovery is imposed to permit sup-
pliers to offer goods of limited performance in the marketplace so long
as they similarly limit their claims of product quality."'
Because the Durfee court failed to consider these conflicting
views and the policies underlying them, and did not address the
potential impact of its statement regarding remote liabilty for im-
plied warranty, its casual dictum cannot be regarded as authorita-
tive. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court may eventually decide
to permit recovery for purely economic loss in implied warranty or
strict liability despite the absence of privity, such a decision should
be based on a careful and reasoned analysis of the countervailing
policy considerations in the context of a factual setting directly rais-
111. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
112. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17, 403 P.2d 145, 150-51, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 22-23 (1965) ("The manufacturer would be liable for damages of unknown
and unlimited scope [under strict tort liability for economic loss]. Application of the
rules of warranty prevents this result [by requiring an express warranty]."). See
Robertson, supra note 58, at 78-79 n.145 (collecting cases following the Seely rule).
Robertson asserts that Seely's is the majority approach. Id. at 78. Dean Prosser ap-
proved Seely as the "sounder rule." Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26, at
822-23.
The main criticism of the Santor rule is that it upsets the familiar and basically
logical rules of contract law. See Economic Loss, supra note 24, at 958
("manufacturer's liability to subpurchasers for economic loss would effectively nullify
several provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code") (emphasis deleted). The free-
dom to agree to limit or exclude implied warranties is one of the contractual limitations
on consumers' recovery that the strict tort doctrine abolishes. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) oF ToRTS § 402A, comment m (1965) ("The consumer's cause of action ... is
not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement .... $"). See also Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) (enforcing an exclu-
sion of consequential damages would be "inimical to the public good" in the personal
injury context). Although there are some indications that an effective disclaimer of this
tort liability could be made against commercial entities under the Santor rule, see
Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 259, 326 A.2d 90, 98 (1974)
("the extent to which the strict liability in tort doctrine will be applied to a commercial
loss is up to the parties") (dictum), the remote seller is faced with the practical
problem of how to attempt to disclaim liability against potential plaintiffs with whom
he may not have had any dealings. See Products Liability, supra note 24, at 1078.
Ignoring contractual limitations on recovery of loss-of-bargain may create anoma-
lous results. One student commentator, noting that the Santor rule abrogating con-
tract principles in consumer transactions applied only against non-privy defendants,
urged that in New Jersey buyers "would be well advised never to deal directly with a
manufacturer." Id.
If the wisdom of the Code is that the § 2-719 restraints on sellers' freedom of
contract are adequate protection for the consumer in the case of formal privity, see
notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text, then there appears to be no reason to
forestall their application where, as in Durfee, formal privity is lacking.
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ing the issue. For the present, Durfee's holding that a buyer may
revoke acceptance against a remote supplier can be reliably applied
only when the goods substantially fail to conform to the remote sup-
plier's express warranty. If the court someday adopts the rule of re-
mote liability for economic loss under the U.C.C. provisions for im-
plied warranty, then, under Durfee, remote buyers who purchase
goods that do not conform to implied warranties will have the full
benefit of the alternative remedies provided by the Code. Thus,
whether the standard of product performance against which the non-
conformity of the goods is measured is expressed by the supplier or
implied by law, the buyer would have the option of recovering his loss
of bargain under section 2-714 or, provided the nonconformity sub-
stantially impairs the value of the goods, recovering the price after
revocation of acceptance under section 2-608."1
If, as Dean Prosser announced in 1966,"1 the citadel of privity has
already fallen, then some may view Durfee as a Fourth Punic Cam-
paign-a gratuitous salting of the ruins. It appears, however, that
Durfee represents a conquest of a corner of the fortress that had
somehow escaped notice in the frenzy of the main battle. Durfee does
not extend the concept of non-privy liability beyond established war-
ranty doctrines. Rather, Durfee eliminates an aberrant judicial dis-
crimination against the revocation of acceptance remedy, pointing
the way toward the consistent treatment of buyers' remedies under
the U.C.C. breach of warranty provisions.
113. See notes 65-81 supra and accompanying text.
114. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, supra note 26; see also Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel, supra note 26. Since Dean Prosser so liberally sprinkled his
two epic works on products liability with metaphorical references to the "citadel of
privity," it has been obligatory for subsequent authors to do likewise. See, e.g., Don-
nelly, After the Fall of the Citadel, 19 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1 (1967); Reynolds, Strict
Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another Citadel Crumble?, 30 OKLA L. REv.
298 (1977); Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 13 (1978); Note, Limitations Upon the Remedy of "Strict Tort" Liability
for the Manufacture and Sale of Goods-Has the "Citadel"Been Devastated?, 17 CAsE
W. RES. L. Rav. 300 (1965). In an attempt to discharge this burden, the accompanying
paragraph is offered.
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